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was only a lawyer. The judicial careers of both Jay and Rut-
ledge were also unimportant, and though Mr. Flanders has given
the details of their most interesting decisions, they afford but
meagre elements of interest in this volume. The succeeding ones,
on that score, will be more interesting to the lawyer, if not to
the layman.
It is after full consideration that we recommend this work to the
perusal of our readers.
RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
RYAN VS. THE CUMBERLAND VALLEY RAILROAD COMPANY.
1. Where several persons are employed to attend to the same general service, and
one of them is injured from the carelessness of another, the employer is not
responsible.
2. Where A, a laborer on a railroad, engaged in making repairs on the track, which
are carrie d on partly by the use of a gravel train moved by locomotive power,
meets with an accident by the dumping of one of the cars, he has no remedy against
the railroad.
3. The relation of master and servant is a relation of contract.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
LowlrIE, J.-The plaintiff, with many others, was employed by
the defendants to make repairs on their road, and the work was
carried on partly by means of a train of gravel cars, made to dump
to either side, and moved by locomotive power. He was a common
laborer, employed in digging and in Lfilling the cars and such like
work; and, as the hands boarded in Chambersburg, about four
miles distant, it was usual, and therefore it is proper to say that it
was the understanding, that they should ride to and from their work
in the gravel cars. While the plaintiff and others were thus going
to their work, at railroad speed, the accident complained of happened
by the dumping of one of the cars, which seems not to have been
hooked, and throwing the plaintiff out upon the road.
The nature of the case requires the admission that it was the
understanding of the parties that the hands were to ride on the
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gravel train to and from their work, and at their work, and the
plaintiff is entitled to use this fact as a part of his case. He can-
not, however, use it as presenting the whole of the relation between
him and the defendants. He was not a mere passenger on the de-
fendants' cars, because his travel upon them was really but an inci-
dent of a different relation, that of a servant, and this is the charac-
ter in which we must regard him here. He was no more a passen-
ger than is the coachman or wagoner or carter, who is in the
employment of another. He was simply a servant, with the privi-
lege of riding, as part of his business, in the gravel train, which
was one of the instruments of his work. He could not and does
not, sue on a contract as a passenger, for that was not his relation;
but he does sue on his true relation as a servant injured by the care-
lessness of fellow servants.
The plaintiff seeks to strengthen his position by the allegation
and by evidence that it was the duty of the engineer to see that all
the cars were safely hooked before starting the train, and that his
neglect in this respect is chargeable to the company. As matter
of fact this does not seem probable, yet we must examine its influ-
ence as if it might be proved.
This alleged duty did not grow out of any contract between the
plaintiff and the defendants, else the contract would have been
charged as anessential and relevant bond of their relation, which
has not been done. If it was a duty which the engineer owed to
the plaintiff in any way, then the action ought to be against him
for the breach of it. If he owed it to the defendants, then they
alone can complain of its non-performance.
The duty must therefore be alleged as that of the defendants to
the plaintiff. In what form shall Ve put it, or how shall we define
it? Is it that when persons are employed to work for others, the
employers are bound to see that the instruments of their work are
and shall continue in a condition to be used with safety ? Then the
coachman, the wagoner and the carter, who ought to know more
about the vehicles which they use than their employers.do, have a
practical warranty that they are in good order; though practically
we know that many of them are nearly worn out; the wood chopper
and the grubber are insured that their axe or mattock shall not injure
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them by flying off the handle; the engineer, the miller, the cotton
spinner and the wool carder, have a guarantee for the accidents that
may befall them in the use of the machinery which they profess to
understand, and which they ought so to understand as to be able to
inform their employers when it is out of order.
If this be so, then the care and skill required of workmen is
reduced very much below what is ordinarily expected of them. If
there be any distinction between any of the cases put and the one
in hand, it is too narrow to be made the foundation of a new rule,
or to cancel the force of the analogy which they afford. Certainly
such a duty has never been considered as belonging to these rela-
tions, and therefore it cannot be law.
The only way left for defining the supposed duty, is to allege
that employers are liable when any of those employed by them are
injured by the carelessness of their fellow-laborers. Though this
proposition has never been decided upon by this Court, it has often
been considered elsewhere, and decided in the negative, and we
know of but one case that seems to affirm it, 20 Ohio Rep. 415.
It has been decided in the negative in cases .relating to those
employed in running railroad cars, 1 McMullen, 385 ; 8 Cush. 270 ;
4 Met. 49; 5 Exch. Rep. 843; 6 Barb. R. (Sup. C.) 231; 15 id.
574; in navigating vessels, 2 Richardson, 455; in driving a wagon,
3 Mees. & W. 1; in building, 5 Exch. R. 354, 6 Hill, 592; and in
factories, 6 Cush. 75. And such is the rule even when the careless
one is the superior of the other, or has a special duty to perform
upon which the safety of the others depend. Where we find a road
so well beaten, it is easy to follow it, and its beaten character is an
indication that we may follow it with safety. We shall trust to this
indication, sustained as it is by reasons which have been so fully
expressed by-others that we can do little else than repeat them.
The rule &nnounced by these cases is, that where several persons
are employed to attend to the same general service, and one of
them is injured from the carelessness of another, the employer is
not responsible.
On what principle can a contrary rule be founded? The maxim,
sic utere tuo ut alienam noh laedas, does not apply; for that is the
most general of all rules, intended to define the duties of those who
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have no other relation than contiguity and common humanity. It
is intended as the general rule defining the general relation of man
in society, and not any of the special relations, which must have
their own rules depending upon their special character. Oar
question is therefore reduced to this, What is there in the special
relation of master and servant from which a contrary rule can be
deduced?
With us this relation is always instituted by a contract, and to
that we must look for the principal terms by which 'it is defined.
The contract defines the duty of each party ; and as we do not find
that the duty which is now insisted on was made.a part of the con-
tract, we infer that it has no existence.
But it must be conceded that many of the relaions of life are
instituied in the most general terms, andthat the special duties of
each party are so well understood in society, that they are left en-
tirely undefined in the contract, and each is presumed to have
undertaken them without their being formally specified, Certainly
no one will pretend that. the duty here inssted upon, has in this
way become part of this contract; f6rno one so understands it,
and no one would so contract, if requested.
There is, therefore, no way left but to allege that the law has
made it a duty of a master to see that his servant do n9t injure
each other bytheir carelessness. Therp is no statute of this pur-
port; and 'therefore the allegation must be tht it is a part of the
common law. B't the common law consists of the .general
toms of the people, and of the maxims and principles on which
they act; and it is conclusive against the rule contended for, that
it has never been found among these, and is not. deducible from
them.
But the duty insisted upon is substantially one of protection,
which cannot exist without implying the correlative one of depen-
dence or subjection. The relations of husband and wife, parent
and child, are in law relations of protection and dependence; and
there are those which are so in fact; as where a weak-minded per-
son submits himself to the direction of another: and here the law
interferes to protect against an undue exercise of influence and
power. And there are others, as the Sunday laws and the laws
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regulating the hours of labor in particular occupations, whereby
the law protects men against the danger arising from undue com-
petition; but the strictness used in defining this relation as be-
longing to special cases, implies that it has no wider existence.
There is no relation of protection and dependence between mas-
ter and servant, or of confidence in the institution of the relation:
we speak not of master and apprentice. The servant is no Roman
client or feudal villein, with a lord to protect him. Both are equal
before the law, and considered equally competent to take care of
themselves, and very often the servant is the more intelligent of the
two.
The argument that the law implies a warranty that one servant
shall not be injured by the carelessness of another, is only another
way of stating the proposition that the law imposes the duty of pro-
tection ; and it must be set aside by the same answer.
And what would be the value of such a rule ? If it exists at all,
it must grow out of the relation, and affect all persons standing in
it; and this would change all our ideas concerning the relation of
master and servant. Every man must have his own business, whe-
ther as master or as servant, and there is no business without its
risks. Where many servants are employed in the same business,
the liability to injury from the carelessness of their fellows is but an
ordinary risk, against which the law furnishes no protection but by
an action against the actual wrongdoer. It would violate a law of
nature if it should provide an immunity to any one against the ordi-
nary dangers of his business, and it would be treating him as inca-
pable of taking care of himself.
If we declare that workmen are warranted against such care-
lessness, then the law places all careless men, which means all
badly educated or badly trained men, and it places even those who
have not acquired a reputation for care, under the ban of at least
a partial exclusion from all work. And this is the ordinary result
of all undue attempts to protect by law one class of citizens against
another. It is done at a practical sacrifice of liberty on the part
of those intended to be protected, and to the embarrassment of
the common business of life, by imposing upon the people a rule
of a new and unusual character, which may require half a century
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to become fitted like a custom, and adapted to the customs already
existing, which it does not have the effect of annulling.
If this were the rule, it would embarrass the conduct of all
business, where any risk is to be run. How could a sailor be
ordered aloft in a storm, without the employers being liable to the
charge that the captain had Shown want of proper skill and care,
in giving such an order, in the circumstances? How could the
wearied laborer be allowed to ride home with the driver, without
danger that the employer should be called to account for an acci-
dental tilting of the cart?
And such a rule could have very little application to great cor-
porations, for they would immediately act on the maxim, conventio
vincit legem, and provide against it in their contracts. But it
would live to embarrass the more private and customary relations,
and be the source of abundant litigation. The Court below
decided rightly, that the rule contended for has no existence.
Judgment affirmed. LEwis and KNOX, JJ. dissenting.
In the Supreme Court of the United States.
Before Judge McLEAN, at Chambers, at Washington City.
THE UNITED STATES, Vs. THE RAILROAD BRIDGE COMPANY ET AL.
1. An action by the Federal Government is subject to the forms of pleading and the
rules of practice applicable to suits between individuals.
2. The commercial power of the Federal Government under the constitution, dis-
cussed.
3. L nd purchased for military purposes cannot be sold without special authority
from Congrebs; otherwise as to land reserved out of the public domain and then
abandoned.
4. Constructidn of the Act of Congress of Aug. 4, 1852, granting the right of
way through public lands.
5. The power of a State to grant the right of eminent domain-to a private corpora-
tion.
6. The right of eminent domain is in the State, and the exercise of this right by a
State is nowhere inhibited in the Federal Constitution, or in the powers exer-
cised over the public lands.
7. A State has power to authorize a railroad through the public lands of the United
States.
8. Irreparable injury to the public lands will alone justify an injunction.
UNITED STATES vs. RAILROAD BRIDGE COMNPANY.
This is an application by the United States for -an injunction,
against the Railroad and Bridge Company, to prevent them from
constructing their railroad across Rock Island and bridges connected
therewith, over both channels of the Mississippi river.
The eas wao ably argued by
The Attorneey General of the United S t'ates, and
Mr. Toyne, district attorney for the northern district of Illinois,
for the complainants; and by
Mr. Reverdy John8on, and Mfr. Sargent, and Mr. J dd, on the
part of the defendants.
McLEAN, J.--The bill states that as early as 1812, the western ex-
tremity of Rock Island was occupied as a military post called Fort
Armstrong; that various buildings and fortifications were erected
thereon, by the United States, which were occupied for military
purposes from 1816 to 1836; at which date it was evacuated by
the troops of the United States, and ceased to be a military garrison.
In April, 1825, the island was reserved for military purposes by
the secretary of war, of which the commissioner of the general land
office was informed and by him due notice was given to the register
and receiver of the land office in which the reservation was situated.
By the order of the secretary of war in 1835, the whole of Rock
Island was reserved for military purposes; and the register and re-
ceiver of the land office at Galena, a new land district, which in-
cluded the island, were duly notified by the commissioner of the
general land office.
Since the troops were withdrawn from the island, it has been oc-
cupied, as the bill states, by the Indian department, by the ord-
nance department, as a depot for arms, &c.; and by agents of the
quartermaster's department for the protection of the-property of
the United States, up to the time of filing the bill. And the com-
plainants allege that the defendants have located their railroad over
the island, and by their agents have made large and deep excava-
tions of earth and embankments on the line of the road over the
island, removing rocks and cutting timber, greatly to their injury
and the injury of the soil, for which injuries no adequate remedy
can be had by an action at law.
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And the complainants also allege that preparation has been made
.by the company for the construction of a bridge over the western
channel of the river, which will materially obstruct the navigation of
steamboats, many of which ply upon the river, several hundred miles
above Rock Island; that steamboats, in carrying on a commerce
on the river, frequently take boats or barges in tow on each side of
them, which would require a much wider draw to pass down the
river than the one proposed to be made in the bridge, and that it
would at all times be difficult and dangerous, from the rapidity of
the current for a steamboat to pass through the draw; On these
grounds substantially, and on the ground that the power to regulate
commerce among the several States is vested in Congress, &ci. an
injunction is asked.
The defendants rely on two acts of the legislature of the State of
Illinois, one dated in 1847, and the other in 1851, incorporating and
authorizing them to locate a railroad, with one or two tracks, by the
way of La" Salle, from Chicago to the town of Rock Island, on the
Mississippi river; and they allege that on the 17th day of January,
1853, the legislature of Illinois created the defendants a body cor-
porate with power to build a railroad bridge across the Mississippi
at or near Rock Island, or so much thereof as is within the State of
Illinois ; and to connect by railroad or otherwise, with any railroads
in the States of Illinois or Iowa, in such manner as shall not mate-
rially interfere with or obstruct the navigation of the river, &c.
And the defendants set up the following report of. the secretary
of war, dated the 30th of December, 1847: Sir, In compliance
with a resolution of the Senate, of the 22d instant, requiring the
secretary of war " to inform the Senate if Fort Armstrong, on Rock
Island, in the State of Illinois, is now occupied as a fort; dnd if not,
how long the same his been abandoned, in whose charge the same
is, and on what terms; qnd also that he communicate his opinion if
the interest of the government requires that said site should be re-
served from sale for military purposes," I have the honor to trans-
mit, herewith, reports from the adjutant general, the acting chief
of ordnance, and the quartermaster general, containing the inform-
ation desired; and to state that, in my opinion, the interest of the
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government does not require that said site be longer reserved from
sale for military purposes."
(Signed) Wmi. L. MARCY.
The adjutant general reported that Fort Armstrong, on Rock Is-
land, was evacuated May 4th, 1836, in pursuance of general orders
No. 9, dated January 25th, of the same year. He says it was sub-
sequently used by the ordnance department as a depot on a small
scale for arms and munitions; but it is understood the stores
were all removed some years since. Rock Island, he states, is not
believed to be of any value for military purposes, and is considered
as finally abandoned.
The quartermaster general reported "that Fort Armstrong is
now in charge of his department; and that Thomas Drake is em-
ployed at a compensation of fifteen dollars per month to take care
of it." It is of no frtlier use to the public as a military site, and
he recommended that it be transferred to land department. The
chief of ordnance reported that as far as regards the ordnance de-
partment, he considered the reserve no longer necessary for mili-
tary purposes.
On the 11th of February, 1848, the secretary of war enclosed
the above reports to the secretary of the treasury, and says, "that
the site of Fort Armstrong is no longer required for military pur-
poses, and it is therefore hereby relinquished and placed at the dis-
posal of the department which has charge of the public lands."
(Signed) Wm. L. MARCY.
A return of the survey of the land on Rock Island, as public
lands as surveyed by the surveyor general, is in evidence.
Under the act of June the 14th, 1809, which authorized the
President of the United States to erect such fortifications as may be
necessary in his opinion for the protection of the north-western
frontier, Fort Armstrong was built. But the reserve was not made
in form until 1825, as above stated.
By the act 3d March, 1819, the secretary of war was authorized,
under the direction of the President, to cause to be sold such mili-
tary sites belonging to the United States, as may have been found
UNITED STATES vs. RAILROAD BRIDGE COMPANY.
or become useless for military purposes. And the secretary of war
is hereby authorized, on the payment of the consideration agreed
for, into the treasury of the United States, to make, execute and
deliver all needful instruments for transferring the same in fee, and
the jurisdiction over the reserve ceded by a State, shall cease.
In 1850 the secretary of war instructed the adjutant general to
write to Col. lason, directing the sale of the reservation on Rock
Island, on terms most favorable to the United States. In three
or four months afterwards a telegraphic dispatch, postponed the
sale "until further orders."
By the act of the 4th of August, 1850, the right of way was given
to all rail and plank roads or macadamised turnpike companies, that
were or might be chartered over and through any of the public lands
of the United States, &c., with the following proviso: "That none
of the foregoing provisions of this act shall apply to, or authorize
any rights in any lands of the United States, other than such as
are held for private entry or sale, and such as are unsurveyed and
not held for public use, by erection or improvement thereon."
This case involves several very important questions, some of
which have not been heretofore raised for judicial consideration.
The suit is brought by the general government, not in its sove-
reign capacity, but for the protection of certain public trusts com-
mitted to it, which require, as is supposed, the exercise of the judi-
cial power. This is more in accordance with the principles of our
government, 'than a resort to military force. The President, under
existing laws, may remove trespassers from the public lands, by a
military order, or by a civil action, or an indictment.
Where a suit is brought by a State, or by the general govern-
ment, it is subject to the forms of pleading and the rules of proce-
dure, applicable to suits between individuals; and wherever an in-
jury is inflicted on the public rights protected by law, a remedy,
civil or criminal, is given.
Congress has the exclusive power, under the constitution, to regu-
late commerce between two or more States, and it is contended
that in virtue of this power, the complainants have a right to main-
tain this suit, on the ground that the bridge proposed to be con-
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structed will be an obstruction to commerce, and this presents a
new question.
The commercial power of the constitution is that which the fede-
ral government exercises in its sovereign and legislative capacity.
It has regulated commerce on the Mississippi river and the other
navigable rivers of the United States, so far as navigation by steam-
boats is concerned; and ports of delivery have been established.
This regulation has extended, on the Mississippi, a great distance
above Rock Island.
But this commercial power can only be exercised and carried out
by legislation; and when this shall be done, any violation of the
laws will subject the offenders to the penalties provided. The in-
strumentality of the judiciary can be invoked only by the govern-
ment, to give effect to its laws, civil or criminal, but the judicial
power cannot precede that of legislation. The rule of action on all
questions of policy, within the federal powers, must be prescribed
by Congress.
There is no federal common law which pervades the Union, and
constitutes a rule of judicial action. But in all the States the com-
mon law is in force, in a greater or less degree. Its existence and
extent are shown by the statutes of the States respectively, and the
usages of the courts. But there is no common law in regard to
regulations of navigation. These must be adapted to the peculiar
circumstances of a country, and the facilities which exist for traffic.
In this respect, the legislation of Congress is the only remedy known
to the constitution.
If it be admitted that the bridge would be an obstruction to the
commerce on the Mississippi river, is there any power in the judi-
ciary to remedy the evil'? The commercial power is in Congress,
but until it shall prescribe the rule, the power is dormant. Congress
has power to punish the counterfeiting of the current coin of the
Union, the violations of the mail, and many other acts, but until
the law shall fix the punishment, the courts of the United States
c~nnot punish.
Neither c~nua proceeding by indictment or information be insti-
tuted in the judicial courts of the Union, without statutory authority.
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The law of redress must be enacted before redress can be given. In
this respect, as a suitor, the government occupies the same position
as an individual or a corporation.
If there be an obstruction in or over a navigable water which in-
jures private right, redress may be found by .an action. On this
ground the Supreme Court sustained the complaint of the State of
Pennsylvania against the obstruction of the Wheeling Bridge, be-
cause it was an injury to the improvements of that State which it
had constructed, and from which a revenue was derived. The State
sued as an individual might have sued, on the ground of an injury
which, at common law, was irreparable. For such an injury the
general government may obtain an injunction.
But no such special injury to the property of the government is
alleged in this case, except as to the reserved land on Rock Island,
which allegations will be hereafter examined. The *power to regu-
late commerce is not property, nor is it in this view a subject of
judicial action where it has not been exerted.
Under the commercial power, Congress may declare what shall
constitute an obstruction or nuisance, by a general regulation, and
provide for its abatement by indictment or information, through the
Attorney General. But neither under this power, nor under the
power to establish post roads, can Congress construct a bridge over
a navigable water. This belongs to the local or State authority,
within which the work is to be done. But this authority must be so
exercised as not materially to conflict with the paramount power to
regulate commerce.
If Congress can construct a bridge over a navigable water, under
the power to regulate commerce or to establish post roads, on the
same principle it may make turnpike or railroads throughout the
entire country. The latter power has generally been considered as
exhausted in the designation of roads on which the mails are to be
transported; and the former by the regulation of commerce upon
the high seas, and upon our rivers and lakes. If these limitations
are to be departed from, there can be no others, except the discre-
tion of Congress. It is admitted, that in the regulation of com-
merce, as a question of policy, the only limitation imposed by the
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constitution is, that no preference can be given to a port in one
State over those of another.
Was Rock Island a military reserve at the time the alleged tres-
pass was committed? That it was reserved for military purposes
in 1825, is clear. The Secretary of War, acting under the Presi-
dent and by his authority, reserved it, and it was so entered on the
books of the land offices at Edwardsville and Galena. And it was
occupied as such until the year 1836, when it was abandoned as a
military post; the troops Were withdrawn, and sometime afterward
the buildings were sold.
The abandonment of Rock Island as a military post, and for all
public purposes, was as complete, as its reservation had been, by all
the public authorities by whom it was selected or used.
The suspension of the sale under the act of 1819, was ordered by
Mr. Poinsett, Secretary of War, not because it was wanted for pub-
lic purposes, but on the ground that the act did not authorize its
sale. On the 8th of November, 1838, he wrote to the general land
office, that "the reservation would not be sold under the above act,
and that it was left to the general land office to take such measures
for the sale of the reservation as it may deem proper, under existing
laws." In this view Mr. Poinsett was correct. The act referred
to, provided "That the Secretary be and he is hereby authorized,
under the direction of the President of the United States, to cause
to be sold such military sites belonging to the United States as may
have been found or become useless for military purposes." "And
the Secretary of War," the act provides, "is hereby authorized, on
the payment of the compensation agreed for into the Treasury of
the United States," to execute a deed, &c.
This law, from its language, was not intended to be a general
regulation, but authorized the sale of military reserves which, at that
time, had become useless. It changed the settled mode of selling
public lands, as it authorized the Secretary to sell for a price agreed
on, which precludes or at least renders unnecessary a sale by public
auction, as the general law for the sale of the public lands required.
This consideration, as well as the purport of the section, showed
that it was not a general regulation, but was intended to operate
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upon military reservations which then existed and which were unne-
cessary.
The Attorney General contends that "the frequent interposition
of Congress, especially authorizing the sale of military reservations,
negatives the idea that they could be sold without statute authority."
Where land has been purchased by the United States for military
or other purposes, it is admitted the land cannot be sold without
the special authority of Congress. In such cases the purchase is
made for a specific object, and being purchased with the consent of
the State, under the federal constitution, there is a cession of juris-
diction as well as of property. Now, to transfer property so ac-
quired, and relinquish the jurisdiction, the authority of Congress is
indispensable. And this shows the reason why the act of 28th
April, 1825, was passed. It provides in the first section, "that in
all cases where lands have been, or shall hereafter be conveyed to
or for the United States, for forts, arsenals, dock-yar4, light-houses,
or any like purpose, &c., which shall not be used as necessary for
the purpose for which they were purchased or other authorized pur-
poses, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to
cause the same to be sold for the best price to be obtained, and to
convey thb same by grant or otherwise."
Now, from this act it does not follow that where the government
reserves its own land from sale, for any public purpose, that a spe-
cial act of Congress, after its abandonment, is necessary for the sale
of it. The President, under a general power given him by the.act
of 1809, selected a part of the land on Rock Island for a military
site, on which Fort Armstrong was built. *And when he finds the
place no longer useful as a military post, or for any other public
purpose, he has a right to abandon it, ad notify the land offices
where the reservation was entered. The entry on the books of the
land offices within which the reserved site is situated, and the occu-
pancy of the place hy the government, are the only evidence of the
reservation. And when this evidence is withdrawn, and the site is
abandoned, the reserve falls back into the mass of the public lands
subject to be sold under the general law. But before such land can
be sold at private sale under the general system, it must, by procla-
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mation, be offered at public auction. The proclamation should give
notice of the sale of the reserved tract as other lands. In this mode,
I think, the sale would be a valid one.
The right claimed in the case of Wilcox vs. Jackson, 18 Peters,
I09, was a pre-emption under the act of 1834, which declared that
no entry or sale of any land shall be made under the provisions of
the act, which shall have been reserved for the use of the United
States, or which is reserved for sale by act of Congress or order of
the President, or which may be appropriated for any purpose what-
ever," Before the entry was made as a pre-emptive right by Beau-
bin, a light-house upon the reserve was built by the government,
and the possession of it for public purposes has never been aban-
doned.
Under the circumstances stated, Rock Island cannot be consi-
dered as a military reserve. The possession of it was abandoned
and the right of government released, through the same authority
by which it was appropriated. And no act has been done by the
government, by which a new appropriation of the ground for mili-
tary or other public purpose is shown or can be presumed. The build-
ing had been sold by the government. The sale of the reserve was
suspended, it is presumed, because there was no power to sell by the
War Department, under the act of 1819. That the suspension of
the sale was in no respect influenced by a desire to retain Rock
Island for any public purpose, appears by the subsequent action of
the War Department.
The next inquiry is 0whether the land in question is within the
provision of the act of Congress of August 4th, 1852, which grants
the right of way through the public-lands to all roads, &c.
The first section of that act grants " to all railroads and McAdam-
ized turnpike companies, that may be chartered within ten years,
over and through any of the public lands of the United States, may
be authorized by an act of the legislature of the respective States
in which public lands may be situated," &c. To the third section
of that act there are several provisions, the last of which is, "1 That
none of the foregoing provisions of this act shall apply to or author-
.ize any rights in any lands of the United States other than such as
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are held for private entry and sale, and such as are unsurveyed and
not held for public use by erections or improvements thereon."
This act required the proper officers of such road to transmit
to the commissioner of the general land office, "a correct plat of the
survey of the road, together with the survey of sites for depots,
which were granted on the line of such selection, which shall become
operative." This survey of the road and of sites for depots on it,
was transmitted to the commissioner of the general land office, as
the act required.
In a report of the commissioner of the general land office to the
Secretary of the Interior, dated 19th of January, 1854, the commis-
sioner says, by way of note: "1As regards the right of way for the
road, now under consideration it is already granted by the general
act entitled," an act to grant the right of way to all railroads," &c.
In the same report the commissioner states, "that several bills have
been reported to Congress of late years, materially changing the
mode of disposing of such reservations, which are now on special
file."'
The opinion of the commissioner, as to the right of way or the
necessity of legislation, before reserves can be sold, whether right
or wrong, can have no influence in the decision of this case. A part
of the land on Rock Island has been granted, and it is proposed to
make, in addition, one or more private grants. This shows, at least
that the reserve does not, in the opinion of Congress, remain to the
extent of the Island.
Although this land cannot be now considered a military reserve,
yet it is not" held," in the language of the law, " for private entry
and sale." Under the general law, no public land can be so
considered, which has not been offered at public auction, under the
proclamation of the President. In giving a construction to this act
the court is not at liberty-to change the meaning by changing the
copulative conjunction into a disjunctive. If effect could be given to
the argument, in this respect, it would pervert the meaning of the
act. But this reading, if it were admissible, would not change the
effect of the act. Land is not held for private entry, which has not
been offered at public sale; nor is land held for sale in the meaning
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of the law, which has not been so offered. It is true the land was
directed to be sold under the act of 1819; but as that act did not
authorize such a sale, the land cannot be considered to have been
held for private sale.
The other member of the sentence describing lands within the
act is, "And such [lands] as are unsurveyed and not held for public
use by erection and improvements thereon."
, Now this provision applies to the period of time, when the right is
claimed by the railroad. The ground in question was appropriated
for military purposes, ,but when the entry on the'land complained of
was made, it was not a military reservation; and any improvements
thereon had been, not only abandoned and sold, but the former
reservation was relinquished and annulled. To hold, then, under the
circumstances, that the land was still a military reservation or a
reservation for any public use, would disregard the facts in the case.
Whether the government might not have again reserved the land
for some public purpose is a question not involved in the decision.
It would be in it, if there were any evidence that such reservation
had been made. To presume such a reservation would be against
the evidence.
-The improvements under the above statute having been abandoned
and sold, may be considered, as not having been made, and so as to
the reservation. But still the provision is not technically within
the statute. It refers to lands "unsurveyed," and the lands on
Rock Island have been surveyed. This is a technical objection,
and to such objections some minds on the bench and at the bar are
strongly inclined. My taste does not lie in this line, as it often
defeats the great ends of justice, and preserves nothing of any
value.
The charter granted by the state of Illinois, to the defendants,
authorizes them to locate and construct their road, to purchase the
right of way, to condemn the land where necessary, and have the
damages assessed as provided for in the charter. And in regard
to the construction of a railroad bridge across the Mississippi river,
the company is vested with power to build, maintain, and use a
railroad bridge, over the river, or that- portion of it which is within
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the jurisdiction of the state of fllinois, at or near Rock Island, in
such manner as shall not materially obstruct or interfere with the
free navigation of the river; and to connect by said road or other-
wise, such bridge with any railroad, either in the state of Illinois or
Iowa, terminating at or near said point; to unite and consolidate
its franchises and property with any or all bridges of railroad
companies in either of said states."
That the State of Illinois had power to grant the charters for
the road and the bridge, has not been questioned. A: doubt might
once have been entertained, whether a State could, under the power
of eminent domain, confer the power of appropriation to private
companies ; but this power has been so long exercisedand acquiesced
in, that it is now, probably, too late to question it.
Whether a State has power by an act of incorporation or other-
wise, to authorize a rail or turnpike road through the lands of the
United States, has not, it is believed, been raised or judicially
decided. The first impression would be, probably, that a State can
exercise no such power. But first, impressions are rarely to be
followed on constitutional questions. They should be deliberately
and deeply considered, in relation, to their bearing on the federal
and State powers. That the federal government is one of enume-
rated powers, is not controverted; nor that the States reserved to
themselves all powers not conferred on the general government
absolutely or by necessary implication.
In the admission of the new States into the Union, compacts
were entered into with the federal government, that they would not
tax the lands of the United States. This implies that the States
had power to tax such lands, if unrestrained by compact.
The Constitution provides "that Congress shall have power
to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting
the territory or other property belonging to the United. States."
Under this provision, Congress organized territorial governments.
Having power to sell the public lands, beyond the limits of any
State, a territorial government was the only mode by which the
purchasers and occupants of those lands could be protected in their
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rights of persons and property. Hence thb implied power to
establish such a government.
The Constitution was adopted a short time after the ordinance of
1787 was passed; and ds that ordinande provided for the govern-
ment of all the territory owned by the United States, no express
provision for a territoifal government was deemed necessary. In
that ordinance it was declared that the States to be formed out of
that territory " should never interfere'with the primary' dispo'sal of
the soil by the Unit6d States, in Congress, nor with any regulations
Congress may find necessary for securing the title in such soil to
bona fide purchasers."*
Within the limits of a State, Congress can, in regard to th dis-
position of the public-lands and their protection, make all needful
rules and regulations. But beyond this it can exercise no other
acts of sovereignty which it may rot exercise' in common over the
lands of individuals. A-mode is provided for the cession of juris-
diction when the federal government purchase a site for a military
post, a Custom House and other public buildings ; and if this mode
be not pursued; the jurisdiction of the State over the ground pur-
chased remains the same as before the purchase. This, I admit, is
not a decided point, but I'think the conclusion is maintainable, by
the deductions of constitutionai law.
'Under Acts of Congress, trespassers on the public lands are
liable to a civil or criminal prosecution. And yet the statutes of
Cofigress are numerous, giving to settlers upon these lands, without
authority, which makes them trespassers, pre-emptial rights. And
this latter policy has become so popular as to induce settlers to take
possession of the best portion' of the public; laids, "before they ard
surveyed or offered for'sale. This policy of punishing the' acts of
some, which are rewarded in others, seems to be inconsistent. The
only excuse for the provision is, that he who takes the timber from
the ground, renders it lesg" ialuable and enriches himself; while'the'
other settles on the land with the view of piirchasing it. But he
is not obliged to make the purchase, and while in possession, he may'
take from it the most valuable timber.
In the case of Johnson et al. vs. HeTntosh, 8 Wheaton, 543,
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it was held, "a State has a perfect right to legislate as she
may please, in regard to the remedies to be prosecuted in her
courts, and to regulate the disposition of the property of her citi-
zens, by descent, devise or alienation. But Congress are invested
by the Constitution with the power of disposing of the public land
and making needful rules and regulations concerning it."
The proprietary right to lands in a State held by the federal
government is, in many respects, similar to that of an individual.
A compact may exempt the lands of either from taxation. An
action may be brought by either, for an injury done the soil or
timber. A conveyance of the title is made by the federal govern-
ment under its own laws; and by the individual under the laws of
the State. The principal distinction between the two proprietor-
ships is, that the government makes the conveyance under its own
laws, and sues in its own courts, whilst an individual proprietor,
conveys under the laws of the State, and prosecutes under those
laws for an injury done. But the important inquiry is, whether
the public lands are subject to the sovereignty of the State in which
they are situated.
It is a fair implication, that if the state were not restrained by
compact, it could tax such lands. In many instances, the states
have taxed the lands on which our custom houses and other- public
buildings have been constructed, and such taxes have been paid by
the federal government. This applies only to the lands owned by
the government, as a proprietor, the jurisdiction never having been
ceded by the state.
The proprietorship of land in a state by the general government,
cannot, it would seem, enlarge its sovereignty or restrict the sove-
reignty of the state. This sovereignty extends to the state limits
over the territory of the state, subject only to the proprietary right
of the lands owned by the federal government, and the right to dis-
pose of such lands and protect them under such regulation as it may
deem proper.
The state organizes its territory into counties and townships, and
regulates its process throughout its limits. And in the discharge
of its ordinary functions of sovereignty, a state has a right to pro-
vide for an intercourse between its citizens, commercial and other-
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wise, in every part of the state, by the establishment of easements,
whether they may be common roads, turnpike, plank or railroads.
The kind of easement must depend upon the discretion of the legis-
lature. And this power extends as well over the lands owned by
the United States, as to those owned by individuals.
This power, it is believed, has been exercised by all the states in
which the public lands have been situated. It is a power which
belongs to the state, and the exercise of which is essential to the
prosperity and advancement of the country. State and county
roads have been established and constructed, over the public lands
in a state under the laws of the state, without any doubt of its
power, and with the acquiescence of the federal government; In
this respect the lands of the public have been treated and appro-
priated by the state, as the lands of individuals. These easements
have so manifestly conduced to the public, interest that no objection
from any quarter, has hitherto been made. And it is believed that
this power belongs to the states.
It is difficult to perceive on what principle, the mere ownership
of land by the general government within a state, should prohibit
the exercise of the sovereign power of the state in so important a
matter, as the *easements named. In no point of view are these
improvements prejudicial to the general interest; on the contrary,
they greatly promote it. They encourage population, and increase
the value of land. In no respect is the exercise of this power by
the state inconsistent with 'a fair construction of the constitutional
power of congress, over the public lands. It does not interfere
with the disposition of the lands and instead of lessening, enhances
their value.
Where lands are reserved or held by the general government for
specified and national purposes, it may be admitted that a state
cannot construct an easement which shall, in any degree affect such
purposes injuriously. No one can- question the right of the federal
government to select the sites for its forts, arsenals and other public
buildings. The right claimed for the state has no reference to lands
specially appropriated, but to those held as general proprietor by
the government, whether surveyed or not.
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The right of eminent domain appertains to a state sovereignty,
and it is exercised free from the restraints of the federal constitu-
tion. The property of individuals is subject to this right, and no
reason is perceived why the aggregate property in a state of the
individuals of the union, should not also be subject to it. The
principle is the same; and the beneficial result to the proprietors
is the same in proportion to their interests. These easements
have their source in state power, and do not belong to federal
action. They are necessary for the public at large, and essential to
the interests of the people of the state.
Tile power of a state to construct a road, necessarily iplies the
right, not only to appropriate the line of the road, but the materials
necessary for its construction and use.
Whether we look to principle, or the structure of the federal and
state governments, or the uniform practice of the new states, there
would seem to be no doubt that a state has the power to construct a
public road, through the public lands.
A grant to this effect is sometimes made by congress, as in the
act of 1852; but this does not show the necessity of such a grant.
Generally, congress appropriates to the road a large amount of
lands. Tile positions are believed to be irrefragable-first, that
the right of eminent domain is in the state; and secondly, that the
exercise of this right by a state is no where inhibited, expressly or
impliedly, in the federal constitution, or in the powers over the
public lands by that instrument, in Congress.
If this view be correct the question is narrowed to the simple
inquiry, whether the construction of the road through Rock Island,
connected at both ends by bridges over both channels of the river,
which include the island, will do an irreparable injury to the public
land on the island. Several witnesses have been examined on this
point and, as usual, there are among them differences of opinion.
But the weight of the evidence does not show an irreparable injury.
On the contrary, it appears that the works complained of will add
greatly to the value of the island. From the nature of thIe improve-
mcnt, this is so palpable as to require no illustration. By the flow
of the river, oi either side of the island, its inhabitants are cut off
from all intercourse with the shores, except by a ferry. But the
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bridges proposed and the railway, will connect the island with both
shores, and bring over it a line of travel for passengers, and for the
transportation of merchandise, which must add several hundred per
cent to the value of the island and its products.
The testimony in regard to the obstructions to commerce by the
proposed bridge, is contradictory. Many witnesses have been
examined on both sides, and while those called by the plaintiffs say
the bridge will, in a great degree, destroy the commerce of the
river, those called by the defendants think it will be no material
obstruction. This discrepancy manifestly arises from a mistake in
the locality of the bridge. The defendant's witnesses live in the
neighborhood of the structure, and speak of it as located, whilst the
witnesses of the plaintiffs fix the bridge much higher up the river,
and where from the rapid current occasioned by the falls and the
ledges of rock which confine the water to a width of sixty feet, at
the foot of which rapids there is a short turn to the left in the
channel, very near the supposed bridge, which would render the
passage -through the draw if not impracticable, extremely dangerous.
But the experienced engineer, Mr. Brayton, who superintends the
b uilding of the bridge, has taken the soundings of the river and
surveyed and measured the distance on it from the site of the
bridge to the falls and above them. This work is laid down on a
map which he refers to.'
He says "from the bridge up and on the sides of the river there
are two chains of rock which at the bridge are widest apart, and
gradually converging as you ascend, until at the distance of about
two-thirds of a mile above the bridge, the channel becomes quite
narrow, not exceeding in width sixtyfeet; that this narrow opening
is in nearly a right line with the channel as it runs through said
point to the proposed draw in the bridge." And it appears from
the soundings that the bridge is thrown over the deepest water in
that part of the river. The engineer says "1 the plan upon which
the bridge is being constructed is a wooden superstructure, built
upon Hawes' patent, supported by two stone abutments and six
piers, laid in water cement. The span between the piers is two
hundred and fifty feet in the clear, except the draw, The draw is
to be a turntable draw, two hundred and eighty-four feet in length,
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supported in the centre by a circular stone pier of solid masonry,
leaving an opening on each side of such turntable pier, one hun-
dred and twenty feet in the clear. That such draw is over the
main channel and deepest water of the river on the line where the
bridge crosses ;" and that it is the line of navigation uniformly
taken by the boats running up and down.
Except the earth used for the embankment across the Island for
the road, but few of the materials for the work have been taken
from the Island. The rock on the Island was unfit for masonry,
and some of it has been used to fill up the unexposed part of the
abutments of the bridge and a small amount of riprap work. The
embankment is shown to be half a mile from the principal building
at Fort Armstrong. Convenient passage ways have been made
under the railroad, so that there is no obstruction to the passage
from one end of the Island to the other. It seems that about one
hundred and fifty thousand dollars have been expended by the
company on the road over the Island and on the bridges. Thirteen
acres and a half of the land on the Island appears to be occupied
by the road. Several of the witnesses estimate the value of the
land without the bridge and the road, at one hundred and fifty
dollars per acre ; the road being made, and the bridges, they suppose
it will be worth one thousand dollars per acre.
One of the witnesses for the defendant states, that he has long
acted as pilot for steamboats and rafts over the rapids, and is well
acquainted with the river; that for more than half a mile above the
bridge, the channel from the draw up is straight, running to the
opening in the rocks, known as "Shoemaker's Chain," and that the
velocity of the current from the chain to the bridge is little more
than two and a half miles per hour.
The piers, except where the draws are placed, are two hundred
and fifty feet apart, which affords ample space for rafts, the bridge
being elevated above low water some thirty-three feet, and twenty
feet above high water.
The falls, it would seem, must, from the rapidity, sinuosity, and
narrowness of the channel, present the principal obstructions to the
navigation of this part of the river. Rafts or barges attached to
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steamboats are loosened, before descending the falls, and they are
floated down under the direction of a pilot. This, it is said, is
never done in the night, unless the river is high. Whatever im-
,provements may be made in widening this channel, it is hardly
probable. that it will be extended to double its present width, which
would make it equal only to either of the draws below. And if
this were done, the passage of the draws over a deep, straight and
sluggish current,.would be much safer than the rapids. Indeed,
from the concurrent views of the witnesses who speak of the bridge
where it is being constructed, there will be but little or no delay or
hazard in passing the draws. If any injury should result to boats,
from any want of attention by the bridge company, or the struc-
ture of the draw, they being managed with reasonable care, an
action at law may be resorted to, as in other cases of wrong.
Having considered this great case, in regard to the legal princi-
ples involved, under the Federal and State governments, the mag-
nitude of the enterprise, the interest of the public in the road, and
in the commerce of the Mississippi river, I am brought to the con-
clusion that the complainants are not entitled to the relief asked;
and, therefore, the motion for an injunction is overruled.
District Court of the United States, for the Southern District of
Ohio.-In Admiralty, July 3, 1855.
STEPHEN DUDLEY AND OTHERS vs. THE STEAMBOAT SUPERIOR; JAMES
M. SEXTON vs. THE STEAMBOAT TROY.
1. In a controversy, in which the question is, whether a steamboat was a foreign
or domestic boat, at the time the account accrued, for which the libel is filed, the
enrolment made under oath by the managing owner, pursuant to the third sec-
tion of the Act of Congress of the 81st December, 1792, requiring the enrolment
to be made at the port nearest the residence of the owner, is prima facie evidence
that the boat belonged to such port.
2. The proof afforded by such enrolment, wil be held conclusive as to the character
of the boat, unless contradicted by clear evidence of the notorious residence of
the owner or owners, at a place or port other than that named in the enrolment.
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3. The presumption of the knowledge that a boat belongs to the port of its enrol-
ment, as to those who furnish supplies or materials at that port, is strengthened
by the fact that it bears on its stern, in conspicuous letters, as required by the
Act of Congress, the registered name of such boat, with the port to which it
belongs, especially where the evidence is, that such boat made several trips
weekly, to and from such port.
4. As to those claiming liens on a boat, as for supplies and materials furnished
under the circumstances above stated, proof that they gave credit to the boat, as
of a port of another State, will not avail, unless they have used ordinary dili-
gence to ascertain its true character, or fraudulent or unfair means have been
used to mislead and deceive them, as to the place to which it belongs.
5. Where a boat has been sold under an order of a Court of Admiralty, and the
proceeds paid into the Registry, and the fund is insufficient to pay all the claims
against it; on a question of distribution, the claimants will be paid according to
their priorities of privilege. Claims of seamen for wages and of material-men,
having a subsisting admiralty lien, if the fund is sufficient, will be fully paid.
The next class in privilege will be material-men having no lien but that acquired
in virtue of a seizure under a State law, who will be paid, pro rata, out of the
balanbe of the fund, without reference to the time of seizure.
6. A claimant, having an original admiralty lien, who has proceeded under a
State law, in a State court to enforce it, will be deemed to have waived such
original lien, and must rely solely on the lien acquired by the seizure under
the State law.
7. For supplies furnished, or repairs made to a boat belonging to another State,
there is an- undoubted admiralty lien, equivalent to an hypothecation of the
boat; but for supplies or repairs at the home port, there is no lien, unless given
by State law. It is competent for a State to provide such a lien, and the national
admiralty courts will execute a State law for such purpose; but State legislation
cannot supersede or destroy a lien acquired by the general maritime law.
8. A master of a boat or vessel, has no lien for his wages as such.
John aauson and . 0. NMorton, for libellants.
rassett J- Kent, and Willey & Carey, for respondents.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
LEAVITT, J. - The questions before the Court, in these cases,
being substantially the same, it is not deemed necessary to give
them a separate consideration. The principles to be settled apply
alike to both, and will be carried out in the decrees to be entered,
although the facts of each case are not wholly identical. In the
first named case, the libellants filed their libel in this Court, on
the 28th of October, 1853, claiming a balance of $1375 97, for
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supplies and materials furnished at the port of Buffalo, in the
State of New York, averring that the Superior, during the period
included in the account, was running between ports and places
on the shore of Lake -Erie, lying in different States, and that
she belonged to a port in Ohio. Many intervening claims-
upwards of forty in number, and amounting, in the aggregate, to
$22,654 23-have been filed under the original libel, consisting
of claims for seamen's wages, repairs, supplies and materials, and
one by mortgage. The interveners are residents either of Ohio
or New York, with the exception of due residing at Erie, in the
State of Pennsylvania. Under the original libel, in the case of
the Troy, there are some forty interveners, all residents of Ohio
and New York, whose claims amount, in the whole, to $17,728 11,
and embrace the same classes and descriptions as those against the
Superior.
Without detaining to notice the previous proceedings and orders
in these cases, it will be sufficient here to state, that at the April
term, 1854, of this Court, by- the consent of all the parties in
interest, an interlocutory order was entered for the sale of these
boats, and directing that the proceeds should be paid into the
registry, subject. to the future order of the Court, for their appor-
tionment and distribution. At the succeeding October term, the
marshal returned that the Superior had been sold for $5,700, and
the Troy for 86, 610; the amount, in each case, being altogether
insufficient to satisfy the claims exhibited respectively against
themi
From the number and diversified character of the claims pre-
sented, and the complicated questions of priority likely to arise, in
the distribution of the proceeds, at the October term, 1854, upon
the application of the parties, the cases were referred to H. B.
Carrington, Esq., as a special commissioner, to inquire into and
report upon the character of the various claims exhibited, and the
order of their priority. The commissioner, in the discharge of
i; duties, at the late term of this Court, submitted a full and
elaborate report on the various matters referred- to him, which,
from its fullness and general accuracy, has greatly aided in the
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right understanding of the claims and interests of the contending
parties.
The questions now before the Court, for its decision, arise on
exceptions to the findings and conclusions of the commissioner.
The first inquiry presented, and one which most materially
affects the standing and interests of these parties, in a Court of
Admiralty, relates to the port or place to which these boats
belonged, during the periods embraced in the accounts now exhi-
bited as maritime claims. The commissioner has reported, as his
conclusion, from the evidence before him, that from the autumn of
1852, till the 5th of June, 1853, they belonged to Buffalo, in the
State of New York, and that from the last named date they were
Ohio boats. As the result of this finding, the claimants residing
at Buffalo, whose accounts run from the fall of 1852 till the 5th of
June following, would be domestic creditors; and as such, would
have no maritime lien on the boats, other than that given by the
local laws of New York and Ohio. On the other hand, the
creditors resident in Ohio, whose accounts run during the time
stated, would be foreign creditors; and as such, have a lien under
the general maritime law.
The facts on which the commissioner bases his conclusions, as
to the character of these boats, may be briefly stated as follows:-
The Superior was purchased by William H. Forsythe, at Buffalo,
in the fall of 1852, and was fitted out and equipped at that place,
under his immediate superintendence, during the winter and the
early part of the spring following. It was enrolled at Buffalo, as
of that port, on the 5th of March, 1853; and subsequently, on the
2d of May following, as of the same place. These enrolments were
made by Forsythe, the principal owner, under oath, in accordance
with the third section of the. Act of Congress of the 31st of Decem-
ber, 1792, which requires, among other things, that the enrolment
shall be made at the port nearest the residence of the owner.
Forsythe, at the time of the enrolments, had the sole management
of the boat; his co-proprietor residing at Cleveland, in the State
of Ohio. After it was equipped and enrolled, as required by the
Act of Congress referred to, the name was put on its stern, as
626 DUDLEY AND OTHERS vs. STEAMBOAT SPERIOR, &c.
follows: "Superior, of Buffalo." Early in June, 1853, it ceased
to run to Buffalo, and from that time was employed in running to
and from Cleveland and Toledo, in Ohio.
The Troy was also enrolled at Buffalo the 26th of October,
1852, as of that port, upon the oath of Forsythe, as the managing
owner, having at the time an interest of three fourths in the boat;
the other fourth:being owned by a resident of Buffalo. Upon the
stern, the words, "Troy, of Buffalo," were conspicuously painted.
It had been previously enrolled as of Toledo, Ohio; the change in
the enrolment having been made after the purchase by Forsythe
and his co-owners. In October, 1853, both the boats were mort-
gaged by Forsythe, and the mortgage was recorded at Buffalo.
In addition to the foregoing facts, bearing directly on the ques-
tion of the character of these boats, during the period referred to,
the depositions of several witnesses were taken, in relation to the
residence of 'Forsythe, the principal and managing owner of the
boats. From these depositions, it appears, tliat Forsythe at the
time was an unmarried man, of somewhat irregular habits; and,
although his parents resided in Ohio, he seems not to have had
any fixed or notorious residence.. It is not strange, therefore, that
there should be some conflict in the evidence, touching his resi-
dence. I do not propose to analyze this evidence, with a view to
show in what direction the scale preponderates. It is sufficient to
state, that in so far as Forsythe may be deemed to have had any
place of residence during the period in question, the weight of the
evidence sustains the-conclusion of the commissioner, that it was at
Buffilo. It is true, the oral testimony of Forsythe on the hearing,
if accredited, would lead to a different. rcsult; but, for reasons not
necessary to be stated, but which will be obvious to those acquainted
with the facts, the Court cannot do otherwise than to view his
statements as wholly unreliable.
Under the circumstances of this case, it is clear the enrolments
of these boats are prima facie evidence that they belonged to the
port of Buffalo at the time of their registry. It is true, in con-
troversies between the owners of a vessel, involving a' question of,
title merely, the enrolment is not even prima facie evidence.
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When offered to show title or proprietorship in the person making it,
it is wholly inadmissible as evidence, for the reason that it is proof
only of his acts, and cannot be received against other parties.
But, upon an incidental question, not affecting the title of the
parties, it is competent evidence: and unless contradicted by clear
evidence, will be held conclusive as to the port or place to which
the vessel belongs. Evidence of the notorious residence of the
owner, at a place different from that stated in the enrolment is
doubtless admissible, and may be available in contradiction of the
enrolment. But, in this case, there is no proof for which this
effect can be fairly claimed.
In the case of Tree vs. The Indiana, Crabb's Rep. 479, the
enrolment seems to have been regarded as conclusiye evidence of
the port to which the vessel belonged. The facts were briefly
these; the vessel was built and owned in New Jersey, and was
enrolled by the owners at Egg Harbor, in that State, as of that
port. Subsequently, a citizen of Philadelphia purchased a part of
the vessel, and, on this change of ownership, it was enrolled at that
place, and as of that port; the other owners still residing in New
Jersey. It was insisted that it belonged to that State; but the
Court held, that from the date of the enrolment at Philadelphia,
the vessel was of that port, and not of the port in New Jersey,
where a majority of the owners resided.
It is urged however, that the creditors of these boats residing at
Buffalo, aided in the repairs, and furnished supplies and materials,
under the belief that they were foreign and not domestic boats, and
that they are to be regarded, in controversy touching their interests
as creditors, as having the character which they supposed them to
possess. This is doubtless the true doctrine, if fraud or unfair
means have been used to lull the vigilance of the party giving
the credit, or mislead or deceive him, in respect to the real charac-
ter of the boat or vessel. There is however, no evidence in this
case, that any such means were resorted to. It is true, a card
purporting to have been issued by Forsythe and another person,
announcing that they had commenced the forwarding and commission
business at Cleveland, in the State of Ohio, has been offered in
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evidence. It is not material to decide, whether this can be received
as evidence, unaccompanied with proof bringing home the know-
ledge of such business arrangement to the persons giving the credit
at Buffalo. There is no proof of this character offered, and no
ground therefore for the inference or presumption that the card
referred to could have misled them in reference to the true cha-
racter of the boats as foreign or domestic. The enrolments of the
boats were of record in the Custom House at Buffalo; and slight
diligence would lave enabled those interested to know to what port or
place they belonged. Besides-these boats during that part of the
season of navigation in which they were engaged in the Buffalo
trade, arrived at, and departed- from that port, several times every
week, bearing on their sterns the significant announcement, and
giving to all, a standing notification that they belonged there.
The evidence therefore clearly warrants the conclusion, that these
boats did, in legal estimation, belong to Buffalo, up to the 5th of
June, 18583, when it was notorious they were wholly withdrawn
from that trade, and were thenceforth during that season employed
between ports and places within the State of Ohio. As a conse-
quence, those who aided in repairs or furnished supplies and mate-
rials at Buffalo, prior to the 5th of June, can be viewed, under the
circumstances stated, in no other light than as domestic creditors,
and as such, have no lien other than that given by the Statutes of
New York and Ohio. Subsequent to that date, they occupy the
position of creditors of foreign boats, and their rights as such will
be recognized and enforced. And, as a further result, the Ohio
claimants, whose accounts date from the time of the enrolments of
these boats to the 5th of June, 1853, occupy the standing of
creditors of foreign boats, and as such have a clear admiralty lien,
which will be enforced, as to those who have not waived such lien
by resorting to the local law of Ohio, for the recovery of their claims.
From the report of the Commissioner, it appears that many of the
Ohio creditors who, in accordance with the conclusion just stated,
had a clear maritime lien on the boats, independent of that given
by the local law, have proceeded to obtain seizures of the boats
under that law, and by process from the State Courts. They have
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included in their claims, not only materials, supplies, etc., furnished
these boats while they were, to them, boats of a home port, but also
such as was furnished while they were of a foreign port. I have
found no reported case settling decisively the effect on the rights of
a party, having an admitted admiralty lien, who voluntarily waives
that lien and resorts to the local law for his indemnity and protection.
There can be no question of his right to do so; but I suppose, in
analogy to the doctrine of waiver, as applicable to other cases, that
the party thus abandoning his maritime lien, as before stated, can-
not resume it at pleasure, and thereby be reinstated in his original
rights. Without knowing how, or to what extent, this principle
may affect the interests of the numerous claimants in these cases, I
am inclined to sustain it; and the decree to be entered will be
framed accordingly.
In this posture of these cases, the important question arises, on
what principle is the distribution of the proceeds in the rogistry
to be made? Concerning the claims for seamen's wages, there is
no controversy. It is conceded, they must be first paid out of the
funds on hand. The next class in the priority of privilege, are the
material-men. As before stated, some of these are residents of
Ohio, some of New York, and one of Pennsylvania. Some claim,
as the creditors of a foreign boat, and rely on their general admi-
ralty lien-and some claim under liens acquired by virtue of the
law of Ohio. The proceeds in the registry, it appears, will not
pay more than fifty per cent. of the claims reported by the Com-
missioner, as constituting liens on the boats. After paying sea-
men's wages, the Commissioner has adopted the conclusion, that the
material-men, whether having original admiralty liens, or liens
acquired by seizure under the statute of Ohio, occupy the same
rank of privilege, and must be paid pro rata, so far as the proceeds
will reach. And, this view is concurred in, by the proctors repre-
senting a large number of the claimants.
The question here indicated, is certainly one of great interest,
and I regret to say, I am aware of no authorities bearing directly
on it. In some of its aspects, as applicable to the present case,
the pro rata rule of distribution insisted on, seems just and equita-
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ble; and, I would cheerffully adopt it, if it did not conflict with
what I suppose to be, the settled doctrines of the maritime law. I
am not prepared for, and therefore shall not attempt, an extended
discussion of the principle involved in the inquiry before stated. I
shall content myself with a very brief statement of some of the
reasons which occur to me, against placing all the material-men,
who are claimants in this case, on a footing of equality, and apply-
ing tO all, the pro rata rule of distribution. It is obvious to me
that there is a clear distinction between those claimants for repairs
made or supplies and materials furnished to these boats as boats
of a foreign port or State, for which a lien or privilege attaches by
virtue of the general maritime law, and those which exist only by
seizure under the local law of a State. The former have their
origin in the fact, or the presumption of the fact, that the credit is
given, not to the owner or master, but to the vessel; and by the
admitted doctrine of the maritime law, it attaches from the time the
credit is given, and is equivalent to an express hypothecation of the
vessel. It adheres to the res, as- a subsisting and efficient lien,
wherever it goes, nd into whosesoever hands it may pass. Not so,
however, in regard to credits given in a home port. These are sup-
posed to be, on the credit of the master or owner, and do not im-
port a lien on the vessel, unless provided by express legislation of
the State in which the credit is given, and on grounds unknown to
the general maritime law. The right of a State thus to legislate
has long since been conceded by the highest Court of the Union;
and, it is equally well settled, that where such lien is created by a
State law, it may be enforced in the admiralty courts. But I am
not aware that it has been anywhere admitted, that state legislation
can interfere with, supersede or destroy, a right or lien previously
acquired under the national maritime law. On the contrary, the
existence of such a power in the States, has been strongly denied.
They may declare that a lien shall exist, in cases designated, and
provide for its enforcement, by a seizure in rem; but, clearly the
lien so acquired, must be subordinate to those existing before, in
favor of other parties. Under the water craft law of Ohio, there
is no lien, till after the seizure of the thing. To hold, that this
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lien places the attaching creditor on a footing of equality with one
who has an admitted maritime lien on the same vessel, would be vir-
tually to set aside .the claim of the latter, and wholly to defeat his
rights. Such, at least, in cases like the present, where the pro-
ceeds of sale are not sufficient to pay all the claims against the ves-
sel, would be its virtual effect. I cannot suipose that such a result
was intended by the Ohio Statute; but if admitting of such a con-
struction, it implies the exercise of a power by the Legislature, in
conflict with the Constitutions and Laws of the United States.
But, without pursuing this subject further, I will state, as the
result of my reflections on the question stated, that in determining
the mode of distribution of the funds in the registry, there must be a
discrimination in favor of those claimants -who have a subsisting
maritime lien, and those who subsequently acquired liens, by seizures
under a State law. There is certainly a fallacy in the argument
by which the conclusion is reached, that because those having these
statutory liens, are material-men, they are to have the same priori-
ties of privilege, as those who have previous maritime liens. The
origin and nature of these liens must be regarded in fixing on a
rule by which distribution of the proceeds shall be made. Such,
I understand to be the rule sanctioned by the learned judge of the
District Court of Maine, in the case of the -Paragon, Ware's Re-
ports, 322. He says, "where all the debts hold the same rank of
privilege, if the property is not sufficient fully to pay all, the rule
is, that the creditors shall be paid concurrently, each in proportion
to the amount of his demand. But, when the debts stand in different
ranks of privilege, then the creditors who occupy the first rank,
shall be fully paid, before any allowance to those who occupy an
inferior grade."
Being, as I think, warranted in the conclusion, that the class of
claimants, in whose favor there exists a present, valid maritime
lien, are entitled to a priority in the disposition of the funds in the
registry, I shall decree, that such be first paid, without reference,
as between them, to the order of time in which their claims respec-
tively accrued. After excluding those claimants who have aban-
Jloned their maritime liens,. by resorting to seizures under state
